T
here is a considerable body of work in environmental law and environmental economics addressing the timing of pollution abatement when there is uncertainty about the potential harms from pollution and when emissions are irreversible. The core idea is that we might want to reduce pollution now more than otherwise to preserve fl exibility until we learn more about the size of the harms and the likely abatement costs. As we teach our children, better safe than sorry.
Environmental law implements this idea through the precautionary principle. There are many statements, differing from one another in important details.
1 A commonly used version can be found in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations (1992, p. 4) which states that the parties "should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientifi c certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures." A prominent legal scholar proposed the following version which is stronger and more explicit:
When regulators are dealing with an irreversible loss, and when they are uncertain about the timing and likelihood of that loss, they should be willing to pay a sum -the option value -in order to maintain fl exibility for the future (Sunstein, 2006, p. 857) .
Environmental economists have analyzed the problem as one of decision-making under uncertainty and learning. 2 In the simplest, two-period models, for example, emissions in the fi rst period irreversibly affect the expected marginal harm from emissions in the second period and we expect to learn more about the harms and to be able to adjust second period actions accordingly. Under some circumstances, we might want to reduce fi rst period emissions to retain fl exibility in the second period. More complex models include both irreversible harms and irreversible expenditures on abatement, so that concerns about fl exibility run both ways. You have to be safe and not sorry about both potential environmental harms and about the possibility of wasting resources on unnecessary abatement.
To my knowledge, this analysis has never been specifi cally applied to the optimal timing of environmental (or other Pigouvian) taxes.
3 This is so even though environmental taxes are thought by many to be the fi rst best solution to pollution problems, preferable to command and control approaches in many contexts. The question I address is whether environmental taxes should be imposed earlier or at a higher rate when there is an uncertain possibility of irreversible environmental harms or later to allow society to learn about the likely harms before regulating. Does a version of the precautionary principle apply to environmental taxes?
The thesis developed here is that as a fi rst order matter, there is no tax precautionary principle: the government should not set taxes to preserve fl exibility in the face of irreversible harms and learning. Environmental taxes should be set equal to the expected marginal social harm from an activity, adjusted in each period to refl ect new information. 2 Relevant papers include Arrow and Fisher (1974) , Henry (1974) , Kolstad (1996a Kolstad ( , 1996b , Ulph and Ulph (1997) , Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) , Pindyck (2000 Pindyck ( , 2002 , Gollier and Treich (2003) , and Ingham and Ulph (2005) . 3 Ko, Lapan, and Sandler (1992) , Ulph and Ulph (1994) , and Farzin (1996) consider the timing of Pigouvian taxes but do not model the choice of irreversible emissions when there is learning. Pindyck (2002) indicates that he believes the solutions to the optimal timing problem apply to taxation, but it appears that he assumes that taxes must be adopted on a once-and-for-all basis and can never be adjusted. This case may have optimal timing elements that are different than fl exible taxes. Section V discusses this issue.
The reason is that environmental taxes decentralize decision making. They impose a price on harm-causing activities and let individual actors decide the appropriate level of the activity given that price. Individual actors will take precautions if appropriate. We can think of Pigouvian taxes as completing the market, and like in other situations with complete markets, we rely on individuals to determine the appropriate level and timing of their activities. The government should not additionally accelerate or delay environmental taxes. This statement is subject to a number of important caveats and limitations. First, there are many versions of the precautionary principle. By saying that the precautionary principle does not apply to taxes, I mean that taxes should not be set higher or lower than the expected marginal harm because of precautionary motives. Some versions of the precautionary principle may merely require the use of expected values and, therefore, are consistent with such taxes.
Second, it might seem that because there is no tax precautionary principle, the information requirements for taxes would be lower than for other regulatory mechanisms: the claim would be that we do not have to solve the optimal timing problem to set the tax because it is based on expected values. This is not correct. To determine expected marginal harm from an activity, the government needs to understand the extent to which individual actors take precautions. The reason is that for stock pollutants, the marginal harm from current emissions depends on the stock of emissions in the future. This in turn depends on the level of precaution that individual actors take. Therefore, to determine the marginal harm from current emissions, the government must know how individuals respond to uncertainty, irreversibility, and learning. The government cannot simply ignore these problems because it is using taxes even though taxes should be set equal to expected marginal harm.
Third, optimal Pigouvian taxes are equal to the current estimate of marginal harm given the then-available information. If taxes do not adjust to new information, they will often be too high or too low, giving rise to timing considerations similar to the precautionary considerations that arise in command and control regimes.
Finally, the basic analysis assumes that information arrives exogenously. The price on pollution, however, may affect the pace of technological development. The interaction between technological development and Pigouvian taxes is complex because general technology policies such as research and development incentives will often apply to abatement technologies. Setting abatement policies to, say, increase the pace of technological development may not be appropriate if general technology policies already cause individuals to fully internalize positive externalities from technological development.
The paper is divided into six sections. Section I provides three motivating examples. Section II sets forth a two-period model to capture the idea of decision-making when there is an uncertain but irreversible harm and we will learn more about the harm in the future. Section III considers the solution to the model in three circumstances: (1) as a problem of consumer behavior; (2) an externality solved by taxation; and (3) an externality solved by tort liability or by specifying property rights. It shows that if taxes are based on expected harm, actors will behave the same as when the problem is one of consumer behavior. Torts and property rights can achieve the same result, so that Pigouvian taxes, torts, and property rights should be seen as substitutes for one another. Section IV then examines how the tax solution to the model compares to the precautionary principle. Section V considers caveats and extensions to the model. Section VI concludes.
I. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
I begin with three examples to motivate the analysis. The fi rst is based on the seminal article by Arrow and Fisher (1974) . They consider the choice to clear cut and develop a virgin redwood forest. Once the forest is cut, it cannot be restored within a reasonable time period, so the development decision is irreversible. Moreover, the value of the developed land will change as will the value of the land in its undeveloped state, and the owner will learn these values with the passage of time. The question is when the owner should develop the land, if ever. Arrow and Fisher seem to have in mind a public choice about the timing of this decision. If, however, the decision maker is the owner of the property and there are no externalities (none are specifi ed), the decision can also be viewed as a problem of consumer choice.
The second example is similar but has a clear harm to a third party. Consider a downstream owner of land who wants to build a dam on a stream or river abutting his property. Building the dam, however, will fl ood upstream property owners, permanently destroying their property. We do not know the future value of the destroyed property, nor do we know the future value of the benefi ts from the dam (such as fl ood control, power, and irrigation). The owner has to decide whether to build the dam now or wait. Although we might classify this problem as one of natural resource use, it has the same structure as environmental problems.
The fi nal example is climate change. Carbon has a very long atmospheric life. For policy purposes, substantial portions of it can be treated as staying in the atmosphere indefi nitely and there is no way to remove it. Marginal harm from emissions goes up with the stock of emissions, so that emitting a unit of carbon today increases the marginal harm from emissions in the future and this effect may be highly nonlinear. We do not, however, currently know the harm that a unit of emissions will cause and, moreover, we do not know the costs of abatement in the future. The question is whether we should reduce emissions more today because of this uncertainty or perhaps wait to reduce emissions because of the same uncertainty.
In all three examples, current decisions inalterably affect the future but the amount of the resulting harm is unknown. In deciding what to do now, therefore, we have to consider the future effects. This structure describes some but by no means all pollution or natural resource problems. Many pollutants only affect the immediate period and then dissipate. For example, the release of a toxic chemical might cause immediate harm and the chemical might then degrade or be absorbed into the environment. Uncertainty about these sorts of fl ow pollutants might affect how much care is taken to avoid emissions, for example, because of risk aversion. The focus here is on the fi rst type of problem, where emissions today affect the value of actions in the future.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE PROBLEM
We want to model the choices in these examples in the simplest possible setting that refl ects both that the activity results in permanent harm and that we will learn more about the size of that harm in the future. Much of the literature has focused on a model in which an actor/polluter has to determine a level of activity and the resulting emissions e i in each of two periods. 4 Emissions in the fi rst period cause damages of an unknown quantity in the second period and cannot be reversed. Before deciding on second period actions, however, the actor learns more about the harm from emissions and can adjust its behavior, for example by engaging in less of the activity if damages turn out to be high or by increasing the level of activity if damages turn out to be low.
Let θ δ + e e ( ) 1 2 be stochastic damages, which are a function of the stock of emissions in the second period. Emissions depreciate at rate 1 -δ, so that δe 1 of fi rst period emissions are left in the second period, and the total stock in the second period is δe 1 +e 2 .
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First period expectations of the damages are based on the information set ỹ. Before the second period the actor will receive new information, y, which allows him to revise his estimate of the damages and choose e 2 accordingly. Discounting between periods is omitted for simplicity.
We can write down this problem as: where the actor gets utility u and v from emissions in fi rst and second period. 6 Emissions in the second period cannot be less than zero, so that any remaining stock of emissions from fi rst period activity cannot be reversed. Learning is refl ected by the choice of second period activity after new information y is revealed. Equation (1) says that we want to choose emissions in the fi rst period to maximize fi rst period utility plus the expected value of second period utility, given that we will make a choice about second period emissions with better information. The internal expected value term in the second term refl ects that the second period choice is based on new information. The external expected value in the second term refl ects current expectations about this second period choice. The central idea in (1) is that we want to know how to choose fi rst period emissions given fl exibility in the second period.
4 Kolstad (1996a) , Ulph and Ulph (1997) , Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) , Ingham and Ulph (2005) all use this model. 5 The extent to which fi rst period emissions affect the second period is determined by δ. If δ = 0, the pollutant is a fl ow pollutant -it completely dissipates. If δ > 0, the pollutant has stock characteristics -it accumulates in the environment and increases the marginal harm from emissions in later periods. Ulph and Ulph (1997) and Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) write the utility in the second period as nonseparable in damages:
v e e e 2 1 2 I use an additively separable form because the central case considered here is where the damages fall on third parties. Separability is a natural assumption in this case.
We cannot simply use the expected value of emissions as of today. Instead, we have to consider the expected value as of today given a future choice based on new information.
Note that (1) contains an important simplifi cation, which is that there are no sunk abatement costs. Reducing emissions in (1) just requires doing less. Reducing emissions, however, often requires expending capital on abatement technology. If harm ends up being low, those expenditures are wasted. For example, if climate change turns out to be less harmful than currently expected, money spent on carbon capture and storage will have been wasted as this technology has no benefi cial effects other than reducing carbon in the atmosphere. In a more complete model, there would be offsetting sunk costs: emissions of pollutants in the fi rst period are sunk because of the irreversibility constraint; abatement resources spent in the fi rst period are sunk because these resources cannot be immediately redeployed. The two irreversibilities, and any resulting desire to preserve fl exibility, go in opposite directions. To keep the problem simple, we just consider sunk emissions.
7

III. SOLUTION A. As a Consumer Problem
Start by considering the solution to (1) when the actor faces all of the costs and benefi ts from actions. Although such an actor might be taken to be a government planner, it can also be an individual who gets the benefi ts and bears the costs of his actions. The clear-cutting example used by Arrow and Fisher (1974) might be an example. The owner of the property will receive both the benefi ts of development and the loss of the virgin forest, so he appears to bear all of the costs and benefi ts of his actions.
In this situation, the actor chooses emissions in the fi rst period, e 1 , to maximize (1). The question is whether the emissions are higher or lower than without irreversibility and/or learning. Irreversibility is refl ected in the constraint that e 2 ≥ 0. The effect of this constraint is relatively straightforward. The prospect of irreversible harm will reduce emissions in the fi rst period. If the irreversibility constraint binds in some states of the world, this increases the expected marginal damages from fi rst period emissions, making it desirable to reduce fi rst period emissions as compared to the case where there is no such constraint. The size of the effect depends on the likelihood that the constraint binds -that in the future we will want to reduce the stock by emitting a negative amount. This depends on damages and on the depreciation rate. The greater the likelihood of high damages for a given stock and the lower the depreciation rate (higher δ in the notation in (1)), the more likely the irreversibility constraint binds.
Learning is refl ected by the fl exibility to choose second period emissions given new information y. The effect of learning is ambiguous. It may increase fi rst period emissions because it lowers expected harm from second period emissions. If we expect to know more about the effects of emissions in the future, we can choose the level of emissions in the future more intelligently, so expected harm in the second period as of the fi rst period is lower. It may, on the other hand, reduce fi rst period emissions because lower fi rst period emissions preserve fl exibility, giving the information greater value. Epstein (1980) provides a complete characterization of the solution. Defi ne π y as the updated probability distribution for values of θ given new information y. Epstein (1980) shows that if the marginal value of the second term in (1) with respect to fi rst period emissions is concave with respect to π y , the prospect of learning reduces fi rst period emissions, and if it is convex, learning increases fi rst period emissions. It is not easy, however, to develop an intuition for concavity of marginal second period utility with respect to updated information.
As a result, solutions to (1) have focused on special cases. For example, Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) show that for hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility in period 2, learning reduces fi rst period emissions if and only if the measure of relative risk aversion is between zero and 1. Ulph and Ulph (1997) consider the case where both v(e) and θ are quadratic. 8 In this case, the prospect of learning increases fi rst period emissions.
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Regardless of the details of the solution, if the actor bears all of the costs and benefi ts of his actions, the choice will be socially optimal. When there are no identifi able externalities, we can think of (1) as an ordinary problem of consumer or producer choice. Actors regularly face these sorts of problems.
B. Taxation
Suppose that the actor in (1) does not bear second period harm so that (1) is a model of an externality such as climate change. The actor will emit too much because he does not consider the effects of his activities. In deciding on fi rst period emissions, he considers only the fi rst term in (1). The standard Pigouvian tax solution to externalities is a tax equal to the marginal harm from the activity. The question is whether this solution applies in the present context.
Consider a charge, such as a fi ne, imposed in the second period equal to the harm
The actor facing this charge will fully take into account all the costs 8 The damage function θ is fi xed and known in their model. Uncertainty comes about through a random multiplier on damages. 9 Other approaches to modeling the problem do not yield simple results either. For example, Pindyck (2000) considers a continuous time model with uncertainty both with respect to emissions (e.g., how the stock evolves for a given fl ow) and damages and with irreversible damages and abatement expenditures. Damages in his model are a quadratic function of the stock of pollutant and are uncertain because of an uncertain damage parameter that acts on the stock. There are no available closed form solutions to this model. Balikcioglu, Fackler, and Pindyck (2011) provide numerical solutions to this problem and show that policies are adopted later if uncertainty increases or depreciation is greater (so that the policy is less irreversible). Keller, Bolker, and Bradford (2004) use a computational model of the economy with the possibility of a sudden irreversible harm such as the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. In one of their cases, they compare abatement when there is learning to when there is no learning. They fi nd that under their parameterization abatement decreases when there is learning, indicating that the value of fl exibility with respect to abatement capital is greater than the value of fl exibility regarding the irreversible harm.
and benefi ts of the activity. The actor will receive his own utility in each period, u(e 1 ) and v(e 2 ) and will face a fi ne equal to
in the second period. Therefore, the actor will maximize (1) and make the same choices as in the case with no externality.
When we impose a second period charge or a fi ne, the actor, in the fi rst period, has to determine his actions based on the information available in the fi rst period. In particular, when there is a second period fi ne equal to actual harm, the polluter must determine how fi rst period emissions change the expected value of the fi ne given current information and knowing that he will learn more and have the fl exibility to adjust his behavior in the second period. That is, the actor in the fi rst period chooses emission faced with the marginal expected fi ne. A fi rst period tax equal to this amount -the marginal expected harm from emissions -will, therefore, have the same effect as a second period fi ne.
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To compute the tax, let e * 2 be the polluter's choice of second period emissions given the information available in the second period and subject to an additional charge for the harm that those emissions cause. Note that e * 2 is a function of e 1 and δ because δe 1 affects the marginal harm from emissions in the second period, and it is a function of v because it is determined as part of the second period maximization. The tax is the (present value of ) expected marginal harm from fi rst period emissions
With this tax, the result would be the same with the fi ne in the second period: the polluter would fully take the expected externality into account when deciding on emissions in the fi rst period.
The tax in the second period is simpler. New information y is revealed and θ is correspondingly updated. The polluter need only be charged the marginal harm from emissions in the second period: θ δ + e e '(
This is just the standard Pigouvian tax with the exception that harm depends on the stock of prior emissions, δe 1 . Given this tax, the polluter will make the optimal decision in the second period.
The conclusion, therefore, is that a tax based on expected marginal harm from emissions causes the actor to make the same choices as an actor who fully internalizes the harm. An actor who fully internalizes the harm has to make choices in the fi rst period based on this expectation, so a tax equal to this amount produces the same result.
C. Property Rights and Tort Liability
It is helpful in considering the results discussed above to compare Pigouvian taxes to property rights and tort liability. Even if the actor does not bear the harm, the actor will make the socially optimal choice if property rights are complete so that the individuals who do bear the harm can charge the polluter (Coase,1960) . Consider the dam example, where the harm is water run-off onto a neighbor's land, fl ooding it and reducing its 10 One difference is that a tax equal to the expected value would provide a certain cost for polluting while a fi ne equal to actual harm would be uncertain. If the actor is risk averse, the resulting behavior may be different. In the model used here, where utility is linear in damages, this should not affect the result. In more general models, we would want to impose a charge equal to the dollar equivalent expected utility costs from the pollution.
value. If the actor had to pay for this use of the neighbor's land, the actor would face a charge of
the harm that he has caused. The actor will bear the full social consequences from his actions, and the result with individual optimization will again be the same as under social optimization. As Coase emphasized, if property rights are complete (and bargaining does not fail because of transactions costs), decisions will be socially optimal.
Tort liability for actual harm
also solves the problem. 11 Tort liability is simply a variant of a fi ne except that the payment is to the harmed party rather than the government (and enforcement is private instead of public). The individual, expecting a charge equal to actual harm, will maximize (1), achieving the social optimum. In some situations, such as nuisances, a tort suit can result in an injunction against the harm-causing activity. In this case, tort liability effectively creates a property right: the actor cannot cause the harm without negotiating and obtaining permission from the harmed party.
Suppose that because of concerns about liquidity or bankruptcy, the government required polluters to prepay expected tort liabilities such as by posting a bond, or purchasing insurance. The payment in the fi rst period for a unit of emissions would be equal to the marginal expected harm given the information known in the fi rst period,
which is the same as the Pigouvian tax. If a polluter prepays this amount, he will internalize the harm. In fact, we can think of Pigouvian taxes as prepaid tort liability, where the payment is to the government rather than the harmed party.
We can, therefore, think of the three instruments, taxes, torts (or fi nes), and property rights as substitute mechanisms for decentralizing decision-making. The choice among the three instruments will be based on considerations of administrative feasibility, enforcement costs, and similar considerations.
12 For example, in some respects, tort liability seems like the simplest system because we wait until there is actual harm before imposing sanctions. We do not have to compute expected harm. On the other hand, tort liability requires tracing harm to individual tort-feasors. If the harm occurs long after the pollution or is dispersed and due to a large number of actors, tort liability may not be feasible. Similarly, property rights are effective in many contexts but may be diffi cult to use in other situations, such as when the harm is dispersed. It is likely impossible, for example, to create property rights in the context of climate change, and we have to instead rely on administrative surrogates, such as cap and trade systems.
11 I generally use strict liability as the example of tort liability. Strict liability imposes a charge equal to harm regardless of the care level taken by the polluter. Negligence, on the other hand, imposes a charge equal to harm if and only if the care level is suboptimal. Taxes equivalent to negligence could also be considered but would be more complex. 12 See Kaplow (2011) and Weisbach (2011) for discussions of the administrative considerations in choosing between a property-type regime and taxation. Shavell (2011) discusses the choice between torts and taxation and concludes that for broad-based pollution problems, such as climate change or emissions into a large body of water, taxes may be preferred whereas for traditional nuisances, tort liability is preferred. In subsequent work, he notes that an advantage of tort liability is that the government needs only to measure actual harm, refl ecting similar reasoning to that in the text (Shavell, 2012) .
IV. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
We can now ask whether the optimal Pigouvian tax is consistent with the precautionary principle. As noted, the precautionary principle is one of the primary legal tools for answering questions about the timing of pollution and abatement activities. The precautionary principle is embodied in numerous treaties and court decisions, although it is accepted much more broadly in Europe than in the United States.
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While the precautionary principle is widely used in environmental law, there is, unfortunately, no single defi nition of the term, so there may be no single answer to whether it is consistent with optimal Pigouvian taxes. Different versions make different demands on environmental policy. I will present what I view as the central precautionary principle and then alternative interpretations.
A. The Central Precautionary Principle
I take as the central claim of the precautionary principle that we should take additional care when there is risk of harm. This means reducing pollution or other activities that have the potential to cause harm more than is required through the use of expected values, such as those used in standard cost-benefi t analysis. That is, I take the precautionary principle as saying that we should use something other than cost-benefi t analysis and should not merely compare expected marginal benefi ts to the expected marginal harms.
Many, but by no means all, invocations of the precautionary principle seem to have something like this in mind, although statements of the precautionary principle are rarely clear on this issue. For example, the United Nations commissioned a body to study the precautionary principle, the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientifi c Knowledge and Technology (which is part of the United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization). It defi ned the precautionary principle as stating that, "when human activities lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifi cally plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm" (World Commission on the Ethics of Science and Technology, 2005) . Morally unacceptable harm is defi ned broadly to include threats to human life or health, so it includes just about any harm. The statement of the needed precautions contains no reference to costs. This version, therefore, would seem to require precautions well above those required through the use of expected values.
14 Another example can be found in the Final Declaration of the First European Seas at Risk Conference, (1994, p. 28), which says that if "the 'worst case scenario' for a certain activity is serious enough then even a small amount of doubt as to the safety of that activity is suffi cient to stop it from taking place." Academics have posed a similar interpretation of the precautionary principle. Stewart (2002, 76 ) formulated a version of the precautionary principle (but did not endorse it) as stating that, "activities that present an uncertain potential for signifi cant harm should be prohibited unless the proponent of the activity shows that it presents no appreciable risk of harm." Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) , Gollier and Treich (2003) , and Sunstein (2006) attempt to ground the precautionary principle in option analysis. As quoted in the introduction, Sunstein would require regulators to reduce emissions to preserve fl exibility when there are irreversible losses and uncertainty about the timing and likelihood of the loss. Gollier, Jullien, and Treich base the precautionary principle on a model similar to (1). They argue that the government ought to mandate precaution in circumstances where the solution to (1) is lower fi rst period emissions as compared to the case where there is no learning and no irreversibility.
We can say from the analysis above that this version of the precautionary principle is inconsistent with optimal Pigouvian taxes. Pigouvian taxes should not be raised above an amount calculated using expected values because of precautionary motives. The reason is that Pigouvian taxes decentralize decision-making by forcing actors to face the full costs of their choices. Actors facing the full social costs of their choices will take precautions as appropriate. Once we have imposed a Pigouvian tax, it is as if we have complete property rights and the actions at issue are like other actions chosen in functioning markets. To the extent we interpret the precautionary principle in this manner, there is no tax precautionary principle.
This can be seen in the optimal tax,
It is equal to the expected harm from emissions in the fi rst period. It is not adjusted upward to ensure additional precaution. Indeed, adjusting the tax upward so that actors take additional precaution would lead to sub-optimal activity. Individual actors facing the optimal tax will already take appropriate precautions.
B. Other Interpretations
There are a number of other possible interpretations of the precautionary principle. I highlight three here.
Use expected values. Although one of the central reasons for the precautionary principle seems to be the claim that we should use something other than standard risk analysis using expected values, some versions of the precautionary principle seem to merely require the use of expected values; they do not explicitly require additional precaution. The goal seems to be to prevent opponents of environmental action from using uncertainty as an argument for not acting. For example, the Rio Declaration (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992, p. 3) states:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientifi c certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations, 1992) is similar, stating that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing action. The Wingspread declaration, one of the most well-known statements of the precautionary principle, is consistent with this view. It states that "when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifi cally" (The Science and Environmental Health Network, 1998).
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If the precautionary principle is interpreted this way, it is not inconsistent with optimal Pigouvian taxes. Pigouvian taxes are calculated using expected values, so they do not ignore uncertainty or allow uncertainty to be an excuse for not imposing a tax. Indeed, if there is a small probability of a large harm, the expected harm might be large and the resulting tax high.
Procedural versions. Some versions of the precautionary principle are procedural. Polluters often may have better information than the public about the likely harms from an activity. If the public does not know about the harms, it may be diffi cult to determine the appropriate level of regulation. By assuming the worst in this situation and, therefore, threatening to regulate, the public can force disclosure of the information. Although it is never, to my knowledge, specifi ed, presumably once the private information is disclosed, all that is required is standard cost-benefi t analysis (unless, say, the central version of the precautionary principle applies in addition to the procedural version). The Wingspread declaration is an example of the procedural version of the precautionary principle. It states that in the context of applying the precautionary principle, "the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof." 16 To the extent that the precautionary principle is merely procedural, it is not inconsistent with setting taxes based on expected values. If there is an information problem in which private parties have information about expected harm not currently available to the government, it will similarly affect the computation of taxes and regulations.
Ambiguity aversion. Finally, some versions of the precautionary principle, such as those found in von Schomberg (2006) and Gardiner (2006) , appear to be grounded in ambiguity aversion. The argument is that if our knowledge of the risks from an activity is insuffi cient to form unique priors we should minimize the risk of the worst outcomes. We should, in the face of deep uncertainty, take high levels of precaution. These arguments are based on decision theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) , which in turn is based on experiments on human responses to ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961) . (Ellsberg shows that individuals will pay less for a bet where they do not know the odds.) Rawls (1999) can be seen as making a similar claim about how actors would choose when behind the veil of ignorance.
The analysis of optimal taxes under conditions of ambiguity goes beyond the analysis presented in this paper. The evaluation of (1) assumes that we could form expectations, and it is not clear what the appropriate model would be and what its solution would look like if we could not. It is possible that when there is ambiguity optimal Pigouvian taxes would be higher than otherwise, refl ecting precaution, but without further and substantial analysis, we do not know. We do not, for example, know whether the ambiguity aversion seen in Ellsberg-type experiments on individuals is desirable or a mere behavioral regularity, and without sorting out this and other issues, we do not know how taxes should be set in these circumstances.
V. EXTENSIONS A. Instrument Choice
The analysis above has implications for the choice between market-based instruments and command and control regulations. The core claim is that to determine the optimal Pigouvian tax in the context of stock pollutants with irreversible emissions and learning, we need to know how individuals and fi rms solve the optimal timing problem. The information requirements for this are similar to those required for command and control regulations. Pigouvian taxes in the present setting have smaller informational advantages than in other contexts.
There is a substantial literature comparing command and control systems to pricing systems (which, because of their prevalence, is usually some sort of cap and trade system rather than a tax). 17 The basic claim is that command and control requires more information than market-based systems which harness private information. In their most extreme form, command and control regulations require the government to specify particular emissions reductions or the use of a particular technology for individual fi rms. The government has to know each fi rm's marginal abatement cost and, moreover, as individual fi rms develop technologies, the government has to update the regulations to refl ect the new marginal costs for individual fi rms.
With a tax, at least in a simple setting, the government does not need to know the costs of emissions abatement. As Kaplow and Shavell (2002) point out, if the govern-17 A number of papers are collected in Freeman and Kolstad (2007) and Kosobud (2000) . The results of empirical comparisons between command and control and market-based systems are mixed. Most studies seem to show that market-based systems are more effective but the size of advantage is unclear. There are a number of diffi culties in making the comparison. The primary problem is that we have to compare an existing regulation to a counterfactual. There is no single choice of command and control or market-based instruments to be the alternative, so even specifying what the counterfactual should be is not straightforward. For example, there are numerous versions of command and control regulations, some which are quite rigid and some that are fl exible and resemble market-based systems. If a researcher is to compare how much better, say, the cap and trade system for SO 2 is (enacted in the United States in 1990 to control acid rain) relative to a command and control alternative, the researcher has to specify what that alternative is. Moreover, determining what the world would have looked like given this choice involves speculation. As a result, the precise level of gains (if any) from moving to market-based systems is unclear. Nevertheless, market-based systems are thought to have an informational advantage over command and control regulations.
ment announces a tax schedule equal to marginal harm at different levels of emissions, fi rms, knowing their own abatement costs and facing this price, will optimize. Moreover, fi rms can pursue a variety of strategies and are rewarded for fi nding low-cost methods of mitigation. Cap and trade systems are slightly more complex but can achieve the same results as a tax with the same information. Cap and trade systems establish a price for the quantity of permits issued through the market for permits. The government, seeing this price, can adjust the quantity to ensure that the price/quantity pair is on the marginal harm curve. For example, if for a given quantity of permits the trading price of permits is higher than the marginal harm, then the government can issue more permits. The government can also automate this by setting a schedule for permits with specifi ed prices as described initially by Roberts and Spence (1976) . Weisbach (2011) reviews a number of mechanisms for designing of cap and trade systems to make them equivalent to a Pigouvian tax.
The possibility of irreversibilities and learning reduces the informational advantages of pricing systems. The reason is that to set a market price on pollutants (either directly through a tax or indirectly through a cap), we have to know what future emissions will be because the marginal harm from emissions today depends on the future stock.
The optimal tax on a stock pollutant is the sum of the present value of the marginal harm from emissions in all future periods. If marginal harm is nonlinear in emissions, we have to know what emissions will be in the future to calculate the harm from a unit of emissions today. This means that we must understand how individuals solve the timing problem. The tax today depends on what people do in the future. Factors that change how polluters solve the timing problem, such as expected learning, infl uence the marginal harm from emissions today. Thus, an indirect evaluation of the optimal timing problem can enter the calculation, even though this is only to calculate marginal harm.
In particular, in (1), the government has to know e * 2 to set the fi rst period tax. Future emissions, however, depend on available technology and the choices fi rms make. The information required to set a Pigouvian tax in this context is not all that different from the information required to impose some forms of command and control regulations. Taxes may retain an advantage in that the regulator only needs to know the variables that enter (1) (or more realistic versions of (1)) in the aggregate rather than at the fi rm level, but the advantage is smaller than in simpler contexts, such as for fl ow pollutants.
The information problem makes tort liability seem attractive over either command and control systems or taxation. Tort liability is equal to actual realized harm, so the information costs might be lower. We do not have to estimate e * 2 . Instead, we can wait and observe actual harm. For many environmental issues, however, tort liability may have other problems, such as that by the time the harm arises, the polluter may be judgment proof or that the harm may be suffi ciently diffuse that the costs of bringing suit or tracing the harm to polluters overwhelm the potential recovery.
B. Taxes that Do Not Adjust to New Information
It is a widespread trope that taxes should be stable. This is captured in the aphorism that an old tax is a good tax. While this may or may not be true for other types of taxes, it is not true for Pigouvian taxes. Pigouvian taxes should always be equal to the current estimate of marginal harm from activity. If expected marginal harm changes, the tax rate should change. For Pigouvian taxes, artifi cial stability is bad.
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To consider this issue, we need to consider a three period problem. In (2), I have modifi ed (1) to add a middle period where we receive new information about the likely harm and can adjust behavior accordingly. The harm occurs in the last period, as before. (To keep the notation simple, I assume that all the information is revealed in the second period; no new information is revealed in period 3.) Suppose that we set a tax in the fi rst period based on the expected harm and the expected choice of emissions given that harm and subsequent information. Further, suppose that notwithstanding the information revealed in the second period, the tax is not adjusted. First period actions will be optimal because the tax is set based on then-available information. In the second period, however, the tax is now too high or too low given the newly revealed information. From the perspective of the second period, the actor is no longer choosing optimally. There would be a gain from adjusting the tax in the second period to refl ect the new information.
For example, suppose that we set taxes on carbon dioxide to prevent climate change, and then we learn that climate change is worse than we expected. If taxes are not adjusted, they will be too low given the new information, and emissions will be too high. Welfare will be lower than it could be. Moreover, a polluter knowing that future emissions will not be optimal may adjust current emissions. Similarly, if we learn that the effects of emissions are not as bad as feared, future taxes should go down. If they are not adjusted, emissions will be too low given their modest damages, and welfare will again be lower than the optimum.
One way to see this is to draw an analogy between taxes and property rights. The price of property varies with market conditions. Taxes, as a substitute for fully specifi ed property rights, should similarly vary. For example, if in (2), θ represented harm to a specifi c piece of property, as in the dam example, it would vary all the time and the government would not normally try to limit price changes. The individual would consider the variance of θ when determining fi rst period emissions and in the second period would face a price based on the information available then. What property owner, upon realizing, say, that harms from third party actions are going to be higher than previously thought would fail to increase the charge for the harm? A Pigouvian tax is like government assertion of property rights in the polluted asset -you have to 18 Ko, Lapan, and Sandler (1992) consider a related problem. They show that fi rst-best Pigouvian taxes should be adjusted continuously and then examine how best to set rigid taxes. They do not particularly address uncertainty and learning, however. Note that most of the literature on the choice between taxes and quantity limits, following Weitzman (1974) , relies on non-adjustment to new information as a source of differences in the two systems. The focus here is on the level of taxation not on the choice of instruments. For a discussion of how fl exibility and adjustment to new information affect instrument choice, see Kaplow (2011) and Weisbach (2011). pay the government the marginal harm to use the asset. The government's charge for use should vary like other property rights, so that the individual will solve (2) for the correct prices. Although there is a welfare gain from adjusting the tax rate, suppose we do not adjust it, say because administrative costs are high. We want to know whether, if we must have a rigid tax, it should be higher or lower than a fl exible Pigouvian tax. We might set rigid Pigouvian taxes higher than fl exible taxes if the harm from failing to increase taxes when appropriate is greater than the loss from failing to reduce taxes when appropriate. We might anticipate the failure to adjust taxes and set them initially at a level that minimizes the costs of rigidity.
While anticipation of this sort might be valuable, the direction of adjustment is not clear without a greater specifi cation of the problem. The loss from the tax being higher or lower than optimal depends on both the curvature of the utility from consumption, v(e 2 ) and on damages, θ. While we may have views about the curvature of the utility function, the shape of the damage function will depend on the particular pollutant and circumstances. A rigid tax may be optimally set higher or lower than a fl exible tax depending on the curvature of θ.
C. Endogenous Technology/Information
In the model considered thus far, information arrives exogenously. Scientists or engineers independently conduct experiments that produce the information y used to set second period emissions. While some information may arrive exogenously, much of it will be endogenous to public policy. The price on emissions will determine the incentive to innovate.
Many believe that in the case of climate change, the development of technology is by far the most important variable because of the very high welfare costs of pure abatement strategies for energy (i.e., using less). Fossil fuels are the overwhelmingly dominant source of energy and if emissions eventually have to be near zero to stabilize CO 2 in the atmosphere, these sources will have to be eliminated. Standards of living correlate highly with energy use. Without replacing that energy, the result would be a severe decline in standards of living. Therefore, reducing the risks from climate change while retaining modern standards of living will require substantial technological developments. These will likely depend on the price placed on carbon.
Solutions to other pollution problems may depend less on technological developments -pure abatement may be a more feasible option in many cases -but technology can make solutions cheaper. The effect of a Pigouvian tax on technological development will be important in many cases. The question is whether and how endogenous information affects the tax in the fi rst period. In a simple setting with a fl ow pollutant, we should set the tax equal to marginal harm and not worry about the effects on technology. Once the harm is priced, environmental technology is just like any other technology for markets where there is no externality. Although it is now understood that knowledge spillovers and/or increasing returns to knowledge may require special policies toward technology such as subsidies for research and development, there is nothing special about environmental technologies in this regard. Once a (fl ow) environmental externality is priced through a tax, general research and development (R&D) policies that apply to all areas of the economy should govern. Any additional R&D policy aimed at an environmental problem would tilt R&D policies away from those with the highest potential.
This approach may not work in the present context where there are stock externalities with learning. 19 The problem, like the problem with instrument choice considered above, is that the tax in the fi rst period depends on e * 2 . If we interpret e i as economic activity in each period, technology will allow increased economic activity with lower damages, θ. This depends on the technology available in the second period which, in turn, depends on the expected tax. We cannot separate the marginal harm from emissions from the tax rate when technology depends on the tax rate.
To illustrate, suppose we think future technology will be very good. For example, we might expect to invent a cheap source of carbon-free energy or a method of eliminating persistent chemicals from the environment. In (1), we can interpret this as having a likely realization of θ that is low, so that e * 2 is high. If, however, we set low tax rates because of this expected development, we may not get the new technology. The development of pollution avoidance technologies might depend on a high price on pollution.
We can rewrite (1) so that second period harm depends on the tax rates in the two periods: The internal expected value term in the second period depends on τ 1 . This means that we cannot set the tax in the fi rst period, τ 1 , without understanding how taxes will affect damages from emissions. Therefore, in this setting, the solution available in the fl owpollutant setting of just setting the tax equal to marginal harm is not available. The problem is diffi cult because environmental technologies will still likely be subject to general policies regarding technology, such as patent law or R&D subsidies. Even understanding the direction of the effects -is the optimal Pigouvian tax higher or lower because of endogenous technology -would require a complex model. These considerations point to another advantage of tort liability over taxes. Because tort liability is equal to actual harm, we do not have to estimate e * 2 . This means that we do not have to consider the effects of technology on e * 2 or how those effects interact with 19 While there is substantial research on the interaction of environmental policies and technology, I am not aware of work that incorporates irreversibilities of the sort captured in (1). Popp, Newell, and Jaffe (2010) provide a survey of recent work. Hart (2008) considers the timing of carbon taxes with endogenous technology, but he uses simple expectations rather than allowing for future fl exibility of the type allowed in (1). He concludes that in the central case Pigouvian taxes should not be adjusted for endogenous technology but during the transition to a tax regime if the current stock is not optimal, they should be set higher. Because he uses simple expectations, he does not consider the interaction of tax rate and future behavior, which is central to the analysis here.
general technology policies. If we set tort liability equal to actual harm, the environmental harm is internalized and we can think of the activity as taking place in a complete market just like other activities. In this case, general policies toward technology would apply.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question addressed in this paper is whether Pigouvian taxes on stock externalities should take the precautionary principle into account. The answer depends on which version of the precautionary principle is considered. The weakest versions simply state that uncertainty about harm should not preclude environmental actions. This version does apply to taxes. The optimal Pigouvian tax considers expected harms. Stronger versions of the precautionary principle would seem to imply that taxes should be higher than the Pigouvian amount (the expected value of marginal harm) because of the possibility of learning and of irreversible harm. These versions suggest reducing emissions now to preserve fl exibility in the future. These arguments do not apply to environmental taxes: if environmental taxes are set equal to expected marginal harm, market actors will take appropriate precautions including, if appropriate, abating earlier. Pigouvian taxes decentralize these decisions to market actors by imposing a price on pollution.
I also considered a number of extensions and limitations to the analysis. The central diffi culty is that for stock externalities, the optimal tax in the fi rst period depends on second period emissions, so we have to estimate second period choices to determine the tax rate. Calculating the tax therefore requires knowledge of abatement decisions which is similar to the knowledge required for setting command and control regulations. Moreover, if technology is endogenous, technology policies and taxes have to be set simultaneously because each depends on the other.
